

































	   	  








The	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  Sudan:	  challenges	  and	  prospects	  for	  reform	  
	  
I. (The)	  Understanding	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  both	  notoriously	  ambiguous	  and	  politically	  charged.	  Any	  discussion	  of	  the	  rule	  
of	   law	  therefore	  needs	   to	  begin	  with	  clarifying	   its	  understanding.	  The	  United	  Nations	  has	  provided	  a	  generic	  
definition	  that	  includes	  many	  recognized	  elements	  
For	   the	   United	   Nations,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   refers	   to	   a	   principle	   of	   governance	   in	   which	   all	  
persons,	   institutions	   and	   entities,	   public	   and	   private,	   including	   the	   State	   itself,	   are	  
accountable	   to	   laws	   that	   are	   publicly	   promulgated,	   equally	   enforced	   and	   independently	  
adjudicated,	  and	  which	  are	  consistent	  with	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  standards.	  
It	   requires,	   as	  well,	  measures	   to	  ensure	  adherence	   to	   the	  principles	  of	   supremacy	  of	   law,	  
equality	   before	   the	   law,	   accountability	   to	   the	   law,	   fairness	   in	   the	   application	   of	   the	   law,	  
separation	   of	   powers,	   participation	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   legal	   certainty,	   avoidance	   of	  
arbitrariness	  and	  procedural	  and	  legal	  transparency.1	  
This	  definition	  reflects	  the	  “thick”,	  substantive	  version	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  which	  includes	  justice	  and	  respect	  for	  
human	  rights.	  Thin,	  formal	  versions	  focus	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  law	  –	  “open,	  stable,	  clear	  and	  general	  rules”	  and	  
its	   administration,	   particularly	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   fairness	   and	   access	   to	   justice.	   The	   rule	   of	   law	  
essentially	  aims	  at	  preventing	  arbitrariness,	  particularly	   the	  abuse	  of	  power.	  Respect	   for	   the	   rule	  of	   law	  also	  
serves	   to	   create	   an	   environment	   conducive	   to	   peace,	   security,	   equality,	   development	   and	   the	   exercise	   of	  
liberties.	  
The	   rule	  of	   law	  discourse	  has	  been	   criticised	   for	  promoting	   “western”,	   formal	  models	  of	   the	   law,	  which	  has	  
been	   mainstreamed	   in	   development	   and	   rule	   of	   law	   promotion	   projects	   that	   have	   often	   failed	   to	   address	  
systemic	   problems	   and	  may	   have	   even	   helped	   authoritarian	   rulers	   to	   legitimise	   their	   rule.	   As	   Upendra	   Baxi	  
emphasised,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  concerns	  both	  the	  rule	  of	  “law”	  and	  “men”	  (people).	  It	  is	  	  
Always	   and	   everywhere	   a	   terrain	   of	   peoples’	   struggle	   incrementally	   to	   make	   power	  
accountable,	  governance	  just,	  and	  state	  ethical.2	  
In	  the	  Sudanese	  context,	  the	  “law”	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  instrumentalised	  to	  serve	  power	  interests.	  Any	  reforms	  
aimed	   at	   strengthening	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   must	   therefore	   be	   mindful	   of	   the	   role	   that	   law	   has	   played	   in	   the	  
governance	   of	   Sudan,	   particularly	   its	   potential	   to	   be	   captured	   by	   elite	   interests.	   The	   reform	   process	   should	  
therefore	  be	  “participatory”	  and	  inclusive,	  building	  on	  local	  visions	  and	  experiences	  of	  the	  law,	  including	  both	  
those	   tasked	   with	   administering	   justice	   and	   the	   public	   at	   large	   across	   the	   country.	   This	   must	   include	  
marginalised	   members	   of	   society	   (including	   women,	   minority	   groups	   (religious,	   cultural,	   linguistic,	   ethnic,	  
persons	  with	  disabilities)	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  that	  the	  discourse	  on	  law	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  law	  is	  captured	  by	  elite	  
interests.	  A	  participatory	   approach	  may	   create	  potential	   conflict	  with	   international	   standards	   and	  principles,	  
which	   are	   part	   of	   an	   “international	   rule	   of	   law”.	   Any	   such	   conflict	   would	   need	   to	   be	   addressed	   further	   in	  
debates	  to	  reach	  solutions	  that	  marry	  local	  experiences	  with	  international	  standards	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  justice	  
to	  Baxi’s	  goals	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.3	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  conflicting	  norms	  of	  Shari’a	  and	  customary	  law	  which	  are	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Conflict	  and	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Societies,	  S/2004/616	  (2004),	  
http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement	  
2	  Upendra	  Baxi,	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  India,	  2007,	  http://socialsciences.scielo.org/pdf/s_sur/v3nse/scs_a01.pdf	  (unpaginated).	  







integral	  part	  of	  the	  Sudan’s	   legal	  hybrid	  system	  would	  need	  to	  be	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  such	  debate	  particularly	  
considering	  that	  these	  conflicting	  norms	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  obstacle	  in	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  
law	  and	  effective	  incorporation	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  norms.	  	  	  	  
Points	  for	  further	  reflection:	  
How	  best	  to	  develop	  a	  participatory/inclusive	  approach	  –	  identify	  constituencies	  and	  modalities	  
–	  to	  clarify	  understanding	  of	  law	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Sudan.	  
How	  best	  to	  undertake	  further	  empirical	  research,	   including	  by	  means	  of	  surveys	  and	  in-­‐depth	  
interviews,	  to	  elucidate	  historical	  development	  and	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  
in	  Sudan.	  
	  
II. Background:	  Experiences	  with	  the	  “rule	  of	  law”	  in	  Sudan	  
The	  recognised	  rule	  of	  law	  principles	  seek	  to	  establish	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  law.	  This	  is	  as	  a	  system	  of	  binding	  
rules,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  ensure	  security	  and	  justice,	  and	  to	  avoid	  the	  arbitrary	  exercise	  of	  power.	  The	  rules	  should	  
therefore	  be	  clear,	  precise	  and	  everyone	  should	  be	  bound	  by	  it.	  The	  risk	  of	  an	  overbearing	  executive	  abusing	  
the	   law	   is	   to	   be	   countered	   by	   a	   system	   of	   checks	   and	   balances,	   particularly	   an	   independent	   and	   impartial	  
judiciary,	  and	  substantive	  limits,	  namely	  respect	  for	  human	  rights.	  
In	  Sudan,	  the	  “law”	  is	  highly	  ambivalent,	  vague	  and	  stratified.	  Formal	  laws	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  a	  
series	   of	   political	   processes	   (colonialism,	   Egypt’s	   influence,	   Islamisation)	   that	   have	   resulted	   in	   a	   hybrid	   legal	  
system	  lacking	  clarity.	  In	  this	  system,	  law	  plays	  very	  different	  roles,	  ranging	  from	  relatively	  well	  functioning	  civil	  
laws,	  to	  highly	  charged	  Shari’a	  rules	  (particularly	  in	  the	  criminal	  sphere)	  and	  laws	  aimed	  at	  establishing	  security	  
and	  order	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  government	   in	  power.	  The	  status	  of	  Shari’a	  as	  a	  source	  of	   law	  in	  particular	   lacks	  
clarity	  and	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  concerns	  about	  its	  influence	  on	  Sudan’s	  legal	  system,	  particularly	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  
justification	  of	  measures	  with	  (broad/vague)	  reference	  to	  Shari’a.	  Formal	  laws	  have	  been	  both	  of	  limited	  reach	  
(geographically,	  acceptance	  and	  accessibility),	  resulting	  in	  unequal	  enforcement,	  and	  have	  often	  been	  seen	  as	  
oppressive	   and	   discriminatory.	   The	  main	   problem	   has	   therefore	   been	   the	   instrumentalisation	   of	   the	   law	   to	  
legitimise	   and	   entrench	   power,	  which	   has	   characterised	   both	   the	   colonial	   power	   and	  most	   regimes	   in	   post-­‐
independence	  Sudan.	  The	  formal	  legal	  system	  is	  therefore	  widely	  experienced	  and	  seen	  as	  alien	  if	  not	  hostile.	  
Customary	   laws	  are	   said	   to	  have	  enjoyed	   local	   legitimacy	  and	   to	  have	  been	  more	  accessible.	  However,	   their	  
scope	  of	  application	  is	  limited	  and	  undermined	  by	  the	  formal	  legal	  system	  because	  of	  its	  limited	  recognition	  of	  
customary	   law.	   Further,	   customary	   laws	  have	   suffered	   from	  politicisation	   and	   raised	   concerns	   about	   gender	  
bias	  and	  arbitrariness.	  These	  developments	  and	  experiences	  raise	  broader	  questions	  as	  to	  what	  “law”	  means	  in	  
Sudan	   and	   “whose”	   law	   it	   is.	   This	   is	   particularly	   pertinent	   given	   the	   limited	   democratic	   experience	   to	   date,	  
which	  has	  excluded	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  population	  from	  law-­‐making,	  i.e.	  playing	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  processes	  
resulting	  in	  laws	  and	  their	  reforms,	  including	  public	  debates.	  In	  most	  situations	  the	  philosophy	  of	  law-­‐making	  
and	  its	  jurisprudence	  in	  Sudan	  has	  reflected	  the	  ideology	  of	  those	  ideologues	  who	  have	  used	  laws	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  
repression	  to	  control	  society.	  The	  philosophy	  of	  “moulding”	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  indoctrinate	  the	  hearts	  
of	  many	  Sudanese	  into	  “the	  civilisational	  project”	  during	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  of	  ”Islamisation”	  of	  the	  legal	  
system	   is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	   this.	  Such	  a	  utilitarian	  approach	   is	   frequently	  used	  by	  politicians	  and	  others	   to	  
subordinate	   rights	   to	   collective	   goals	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   individual	   rights,	   minority	   rights	   and	   the	   rights	   of	  
vulnerable	  groups.	  	  
The	   overall	   weakness	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   lack	   of	   constitutionalism.	   Sudan	   has	   had	   a	  
number	  of	  constitutions	  but	  has	  experienced	  neither	  democratic	  processes	  of	  constitution-­‐making	  nor	  respect	  







executive	  hegemony	  insufficiently	  checked	  by	  the	  judiciary.	  This	  development	  became	  even	  more	  pronounced	  
after	  1989	  when	  the	   judiciary	  was	  first	  systematically	  dismantled,	   i.e.	  “purged”,	  and	  then	  rebuilt	   in	  a	   fashion	  
largely	  subservient	   to	  government	   interests.	  The	   legal	   system	   is	   riddled	  with	   laws	   that	  enshrine	  deep	  seated	  
power	   imbalances	   (e.g.	   system	   of	   immunities	   and	   special	   courts	   resulting	   in	   impunity),	   discrimination,	  
particularly	  based	  on	  gender	  (personal	  status	  law,	  criminal	  law,	  evidence)	  and	  lack	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  
(multiple).	  Legal	  procedures	  fail	  to	  adhere	  to	  minimum	  standards	  of	  justice	  (e.g.	  anti-­‐terrorism	  law	  and	  criminal	  
laws	  and	  procedures,	  public	  order	   laws)	  and	  sanctions	  are	  harsh	   (corporal	  punishments	   including	  stoning	   for	  
zina,	   amputations	   for	   theft,	   lashing	   and	   death	   penalty	   for	   apostasy)	   as	   well	   as	   being	   applied	   against	   the	  
weakest	   in	   the	   society,	   including	  with	   a	   gender	  bias.	   Institutions	   tasked	  with	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system	  are	  
both	   overly	   powerful	   (e.g.	   immunities,	   special	   courts,	   punishments)	   and	   weak,	   with	   large	   swathes	   of	   the	  
country	  lacking	  adequate	  law	  enforcement	  (infrastructure,	  capacity,	  corruption,	  security).	  Lack	  of	  clarity	  in	  the	  
law,	  particularly	  land	  law,	  and	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  system	  of	  local	  and	  native	  administration	  have,	  among	  other	  
factors,	  contributed	  to	  armed	  conflict	  such	  as	  in	  Darfur.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  systems	  responsive	  to	  victims’	  rights	  
and	  communities’	  demands	  for	   justice,	   the	   lack	  of	  effective	  “transitional	   justice”	  measures,	  such	  as	  on	  truth,	  
justice,	   reparation	   and	   guarantees	   of	   non-­‐recurrence,4	   has	   deepened	   grievances	   and	   serves	   to	   perpetuate	  
conflict.	  The	   law	  also	  had	  a	  detrimental	   impact	  on	  development.	  Commercial	   laws	   lack	  transparency	  and	  the	  
inadequate	   regulatory	   regime	   facilitates	   a	   parallel	   economy	   and	   corruption.	   The	   informal	   economy	   is	   not	  
regulated	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Sudanese	  lack	  protection	  of	  the	  law	  in	  many	  aspects	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  
their	  daily	  survival	   including,	  among	  other	  things,	  social	  security,	  fundamental	  rights	  at	  work	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
health.	   Further,	   there	   is	   limited	   recognition	   of	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   rights	   both	   in	   the	   interim	  
constitution	   (where	   they	  are	  mainly	   referred	   to	  under	  non-­‐binding	  guiding	  principles),	   and	   in	   statutory	   law.5	  
This	  includes	  the	  prohibition	  of	  gender-­‐based	  discrimination	  in	  the	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  field,6	  and	  the	  
absence	   of	   laws	   and	   social	   dialogue	   between	   stakeholders	   that	   would	   allow	   unions	   and	   other	   civil	   society	  
actors	   to	   function	   freely.	   Economic	   and	   social	   rights	   are	   not	   reflected	   in	   policy	   making,	   including	   gender	  
sensitive	   budgeting,	   and	   are	   not	   seen	   as	   justiciable,	   thereby	   undermining	   the	   prospects	   for	   their	   adequate	  
protection.	  	  
The	   legal	   profession	   itself	   suffers	   from	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   profound	   changes	   that	   have	   been	  
implemented	   since	   1989,	   including	  mass	   dismissal	   of	   judges,	   exile	   of	   a	   number	  of	   senior	   lawyers,	   change	   in	  
curricula	  and	  language	  of	  instruction	  and	  a	  perceived	  lowering	  of	  standards.	  	  
Amin	  M.	  Medani,	  in	  reflecting	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Sudan’s	  legal	  system	  and	  the	  need	  for	  reform,	  concludes	  
that	  
the	  Sudanese	  Law	  is	  passing	  through	  a	  state	  of	  haziness,	  contradiction	  and	  ambiguity.	  The	  
confusion	   emanates	   from	   the	   conflicting	   legal	   texts,	   from	   contradicting	   orientations	   and	  
from	  the	  divergent	  legal	  cultures	  of	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  This	  makes	  the	  lawyer,	  
let	  alone	  the	  citizen,	  doubtful	  about	  the	  applicable	  law	  in	  any	  particular	  situation.	  This	  is	  the	  
case	   in	   all	   sorts	   and	   levels	   of	   courts.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	   will	   not	  
accomplish	  either	   justice	  or	  equity	  and	  will	   not	   facilitate	   the	  protection	  of	   citizens’	   rights.	  
Nor	  will	  it	  facilitate	  the	  safety	  and	  stability	  of	  society.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  in	  this	  regard	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  promotion	  of	  truth,	  justice,	  reparation	  and	  guarantees	  of	  non-­‐recurrence,	  Mr.	  
Pablo	  de	  Greiff,	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Index.aspx.	  	  
5	  See	  Ahmed	  Abdelgadir	  Ahmed,	  ‘Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  Under	  the	  Constitutional	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  in	  the	  Sudan’,	  REDRESS,	  University	  
of	  Khartoum-­‐	  Faculty	  of	  Law	  and	  Sudanese	  Human	  Rights	  Monitor,	  The	  Constitutional	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Sudan:	  Challenges	  and	  
Future	  Perspectives,	  January	  2014,	  32-­‐41,	  http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/140127FINAL%20Sudan%20UoK%20Report.pdf	  	  
6	  See	  Ebtisam	  Sanhouri	  Elrayh,	  Women’s	  Rights	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Bill	  of	  Rights:	  Issues	  of	  Status,	  Equality	  and	  Non-­‐Discrimination,	  ibid.	  42-­‐62.	  
7	  Amin	  M.	  Medani,	  Law	  Reform	  in	  the	  Sudan,	  published	  as	  occasional	  paper	  on	  the	  website	  of	  the	  project	  for	  criminal	  law	  reform	  in	  Sudan,	  







While	   concerted	   efforts	   have	   been	  made	   to	   raise	   rights	   awareness,	   in	   particular	   during	   the	   Comprehensive	  
Peace	  Agreement	  (CPA)	  implementation,	  individuals	  and	  communities	  have	  limited	  scope	  to	  effectively	  engage	  
with	   the	   system,	   and	   civil	   society	   remains	   too	   weak	   and	   constrained	   to	   substantially	   contribute	   to	  
strengthening	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	   Efforts	   by	   international	   agencies,	   particularly	   the	   various	   UN	   bodies,	   UNMIS,	  
UNAMID	  and	  UNDP,	  the	  AU	  High-­‐Level	  Panel	  on	  Darfur,	  and	  international	  NGOs	  have	  provided	  valuable	  space	  
for	  engagement.	  However,	  they	  have,	  at	   least	   in	  the	  short	  term,	  had	  limited	  impact	  due	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  vision	  in	  
many	   instances,	  being	  compromised	  and	  being	  mainly	  occupied	  with	  making	  sure	  that	  the	  referendum	  takes	  
place	   as	   planned.	   This	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   true	   democratic	   transformation	   in	   both	  
Sudans.	   The	   recommendations	   of	   regional	   and	   international	   bodies,	   such	   as	   the	  UN	   Independent	   Expert	   on	  
human	   rights	   in	   Sudan,	   UN	   treaty	   and	   charter	   bodies	   and	   the	   African	   Commission	   on	   Human	   and	   Peoples’	  
Rights	   have	   –	  with	   few	   exceptions	   –	   not	   been	   complied	  with.8	   The	   resulting	   arbitrariness	   and	   impunity	   has	  
contributed	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   trust	   in	   Sudan’s	   justice	   system,	   particularly	   in	   cases	   that	   touch	   on	   issues	   seen	   as	  
sensitive	  by	  the	  regime.	  This	  applies	  particularly	  to	  marginalised	  members	  of	  society,	   including	  those	  living	  in	  
the	  periphery	  of	  Sudan	  (which	  includes	  the	  majority),	  women,	  and	  those	  politically	  opposed	  to	  the	  regime.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  clear	  that	  respect	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Sudan	  requires	  a	  fundamental	  transformation.	  This	  includes	  
acknowledgment	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  power,	  accountability	  and	  reparation	  for	  such	  abuse,	  and	  profound	  legislative	  
and	  institutional	  reforms.	  
	  
III. Legal	  reforms	  
	  
1. Constitution	  
Constitutions	   are	   pivotal	   for	   any	   legal	   system;	   the	   lack	   of	   respect	   for	   successive	   constitutions	   in	   Sudan	  
therefore	   reflects	   a	   broader	   disregard	   for	   the	   rule	   of	   law.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   Interim	  National	   Constitution	  of	  
2005	  (INC	  2005)	  endorsed	  a	  number	  of	  important	  principles	  emanating	  from	  the	  CPA.	  The	  new	  constitution	  will	  
be	  an	  important	  site	  to	  express	  visions,	  principles	  and	  modalities	  of	  and	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Sudan.	  This	  is	  not	  
confined	  to	  the	  administration	  of	   justice.	   It	  also	  includes	  the	  law-­‐making	  process,	   including	  questions	  such	  as	  
the	  powers	  of	  the	  president,	  regionalism	  and	  federalism	  including	  fiscal	  federalism,	  local	  government,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  status,	  powers	  and	  role	  of	  various	  institutions.	  
The	  constitutional	  review	  process	  is	  an	  important	  opportunity	  to	  discuss	  a	  range	  of	  constitutional	  matters	  and	  
gauge	  public	  preferences	  in	  Sudan	  on	  how	  to	  address	  fundamental	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  Sudan’s	  state	  
and	  legal	  system.	  This	  requires	  a	  participatory	  process,	  however:	  	  
the	  [Human	  Rights]	  Committee	  is	  concerned	  by	  reports	  that	  it	  has	  not	  been	  conducted	  with	  
full	   inclusiveness	   nor	   under	   conditions	   allowing	   full	   freedom	   of	   debate	   (such	   as	   media	  
freedom,	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  and	  freedom	  from	  arbitrary	  detention	  and	  ill-­‐treatment).9	  	  
Sudan’s	   experience	   indicates	   that	   constitutional	   reform	   has	   to	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   institutional	   reform;	  
agreeing	  on	  the	  “substantive”	  norms	  of	  a	  new	  constitution	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  protection	  of	  
rights.	  The	  constitutional	  debate	  should	  therefore	  venture	  beyond	  the	  text	  of	   the	  constitution	  and	  find	  ways	  
and	  means	  to	  advocate	  for	  two	  principles:	  “constitutionalism”	  and	  “effectiveness”	  of	  institutional	  mechanisms	  
for	   the	   effective	   protection	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law;	   if	   these	   mechanisms	   are	   not	   in	   place,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  REDRESS	  and	  Sudanese	  Human	  Rights	  Monitor,	  Human	  Rights	  Concerns	  and	  Barriers	  to	  Justice	  in	  Sudan:	  National,	  Regional	  and	  International	  
Perspectives,	  A	  compilation	  of	  Sudan	  Law	  Reform	  Advocacy	  Briefings,	  February	  2014,	  26-­‐39,	  
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/140228HumanRightsConcernFINAL.pdf	  	  







“constitutional	  protection	  will	  remain	  ’ink	  on	  paper’	  without	  any	  teeth”.10	  For	  any	  constitutional	  reform	  to	  be	  
effective	   and	   meaningful,	   institutional	   reform	   is	   needed	   for	   important	   sectors	   such	   as	   the	   Police	   and	   the	  
National	  Intelligence	  and	  Security	  Services	  (NISS).	  Such	  reform	  should	  address	  the	  NISS’s	  powers	  of	  arrest	  and	  
detention,	   immunities	   of	   NISS	   personnel,	   as	   well	   as	   accountability	   and	   effective	   parliamentary	   and	   judicial	  
oversight.	  
The	   constitutional	   review	   process	   is	   a	   priority	   because	   it	   provides	   an	   opportunity	   to	   develop	   a	   substantive	  
vision	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  bodies	  tasked	  with	  law	  reform.	  From	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  perspective,	  this	  includes:	  
-­‐ Enshrining	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	   constitution,	   including	   by	   clarifying	   the	   status	   of	   Shari’a	   and	   of	  
customary	  law	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  international	  human	  rights	  norms;	  
-­‐ Circumscribing	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  President,	  including	  law	  making	  powers;	  
-­‐ Control	  of	  emergency	  powers;	  
-­‐ Enhancing	  parliamentary	  oversight	   (while	   in	  place	   to	   some	  degree,	   it	   is	   not	   effective	  because	  of	   the	  
current	  political	  constellation);	  
-­‐ Establishing	  an	  independent	  law	  reform	  commission	  (there	  has	  been	  a	  proliferation	  of	  bodies	  that	  have	  
remained	  weak	   due	   to	  mandate	   and	   capacity	   constraints	   (i.e.	   NCRC),	   however,	   if	   these	   issues	  were	  
adequately	  addressed,	  a	  law	  reform	  commission	  might	  be	  able	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  as	  experiences	  
in	  other	  countries	  show).	  
	  
Strengthening	  civil	  and	  political	   rights	   (civil	   society	  advocacy,	  media	  scrutiny),	  women’s	   rights	  and	  economic,	  
social	   and	   cultural	   rights.	   Two	   important	   principles	   may	   be	   enshrined	   here:	   public	   interest	   litigation	   (locus	  
standi)	   and	   “justiciability”	   of	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   rights	   and	   not	   only	   as	   part	   of	   the	   “Guiding	  
Principles”	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  	  
	  
2. Legislation	  
A	  number	  of	   Sudanese	   laws	   are	   incompatible	  with	   the	  Constitution	   and	   international	   standards,	   particularly	  
international	  human	   rights	   law.	  Binding	  obligations	  under	   international	  human	   rights	   treaties	  are	  an	   integral	  
part	  of	  Sudan’s	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  under	  article	  27	  (3)	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  article	  27	  (3)	  marked	  the	  
transition	   from	   a	   dualist	   system	   (requiring	   implementing	   legislation)	   to	   a	   monist	   system	   (international	   law	  
applies	   directly).	   It	   was	   therefore	   hailed	   by	   civil	   society	   groups	   and	   academics	   as	   transforming	   all	   ratified	  
international	  human	  rights	   law	  at	  the	  national	   level.	  However,	  this	  automatic	  transformation	  of	   international	  
law	  continues	  to	  raise	  serious	  difficulties	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  actual	  implementation	  by	  law	  enforcement	  institutions.	  
The	   incorporation	   of	   international	   law,	   and	   its	   status	   in	   Sudan’s	   legal	   system	   lacks	   clarity	   due	   to	   several	  
ambiguities.	   This	   includes	   how	   to	   resolve	   discrepancies	   between	   the	   international	   human	   rights	   treaty	  
provisions	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  rights	  in	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  and	  how	  to	  resolve	  questions	  of	  hierarchy	  between	  
Shari’a	  and	  international	  law	  in	  case	  of	  conflict.	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  has	  not	  satisfactorily	  addressed	  these	  
issues	   to	  date.	  Hence,	   the	   reception	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   treaties	  within	   the	  Sudanese	   legal	   system	  
and	  the	  inherent	  conflicts	  between	  different	  legal	  norms	  or	  regimes	  are	  fundamental	  questions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  
tackled	  in	  any	  new	  agenda	  for	  constitutional	  and	  institutional	  reform	  in	  Sudan.	  
Sudan	   has	   recently	   undertaken	   some	   limited	   reforms	   that	   partially	   reflect	   recognised	   international	   legal	  
standards.	   This	   includes	   enactment	   of	   the	   Persons	   with	   Disabilities	   Act	   (2009),	   Child	   Act	   (2010),	   Asylum	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   See	  Mohamed	  Abdelsalam	  Babiker,	   ‘Why	  Constitutional	  Bills	   of	  Rights	   fail	   to	  protect	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Regulation	   Act	   (2014)	   and	   Combatting	   of	   Trafficking	   Act	   (2014).	   However,	   detailed	   scrutiny	   of	   Sudan’s	   laws	  
over	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  identified	  a	  series	  of	  shortcomings.	  
Substantive	  concerns	  over	  Sudan’s	  laws	  include:	  
1. Repression:	  
(i) Repressive	   laws:	   broad	   and	   vague	   offences;	   laws	   criminalising	   what	   should	   not	   be	   criminal	   under	  
international	  human	   rights	  norms,	   e.g.	   adultery,	   apostasy;	   emergency	   laws;	   anti-­‐terrorism	   law;	  press	  
and	  publication	  act;	  making	  civilians	  subject	  to	  military	  law;	  detaining	  individuals	  for	  indefinite	  periods	  
for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  honour	  contractual	  and	  commercial	  obligations	  (article	  11	  of	  the	  ICCPR);	  	  	  
(ii) Overly	  broad	  executive	  powers:	  arrest	  and	  detention,	  particularly	  national	  security	  act;	  lack	  of	  custodial	  
safeguards	  and	  limited	  judicial	  review;	  prison	  laws;	  
(iii) Procedural	   deficiencies	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   justice:	   rights	   of	   the	   defence;	   release	   on	   bail,	  
prevalence	   of	   summary	   trials,	   in	   particular	   public	   order	   courts.;	   trials	   before	   anti-­‐terrorism	   courts;	  
limited	  legal	  aid;	  	  
(iv) Inhuman	   and	   disproportionate	   punishments:	   corporal	   punishments	   (including	   lashing	   and	   cross-­‐
amputation)	  and	  the	  death	  penalty.	  
	  
2. Discrimination	  
(i) Gender-­‐based	   discrimination:	   personal	   status	   law;	   evidentiary	   rules;	   public	   order	   laws;	   laws	   on	   rape	  
and	  sexual	  violence,	  including	  female	  genital	  mutilation	  (FGM)	  (lack	  of	  protection);	  
(ii) Nationality	  and	   immigration	   laws:	  creating	  statelessness	  due	  to	  deliberate	  denationalization	  of	  South	  
Sudanese	  after	  secession	  and	  rendering	  many	  individuals	  and	  groups	  as	  de	  facto	  or	  de	  jure	  stateless	  (in	  
situ	  populations	  in	  their	  own	  country	  (women,	  children,	  mixed	  marriages,	  pastoralists,	  border	  tribes));	  
lack	   of	   adequate	   recognition	   of	   minorities;	   deportation	   of	   migratory	   populations,	   refugees,	   human	  
trafficking	  and	  lack	  of	  due	  process	  of	  law	  protecting	  those	  vulnerable	  groups	  in	  the	  society.	  
	  
3. 	  Impunity	  
(i) Lack	  of,	  or	  inadequate	  criminalisation:	  no	  offence	  of	  torture,	  or	  enforced	  disappearance	  in	  conformity	  
with	   internationally	   recognised	   definitions;	   definitions	   of	   international	   crimes	   differ	   in	   the	   Armed	  
Forces	  Act	   (2007)	   and	  Criminal	   Act	   (2009)	   amendments	   and	   are	   not	   fully	   in	   line	  with	   internationally	  
recognised	  definitions;	  	  
(ii) Liability:	  particularly	  lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  command/superior	  responsibility;	  
(iii) Immunity:	  army,	  police,	  security	  and	  other	  officials	  enjoy	  immunity	  from	  prosecution;	  
(iv) Statutes	  of	  limitation:	  limitation	  periods	  are	  short,	  entrenching	  impunity	  for	  crimes	  that	  have	  not	  been	  
prosecuted;	  	  
(v) Special	   Courts:	   police,	   army	   and	   security	   operate	   special	   courts	   that	   raise	   concerns	   about	   lack	   of	  
transparency	  and	  accountability;	  and	  due	  process	  of	  law;	  
(vi) Victims’	   rights:	   lack	   of	   recognition	   of	   victims’	   rights	   (participation,	   protection,	   right	   to	   be	   informed,	  
lawyer,	  etc)	  
(vii) Monitoring:	  lack	  of	  freedom	  of	  information	  act	  and	  media	  freedoms	  (broadcasting	  laws).	  
	  
4. Lack	  of	  reparation	  
(i) Constitutional	  right	  to	  litigation	  not	  matched	  by	  explicit	  right	  to	  reparation	  for	  human	  rights	  violations;	  
(ii) Immunity:	  see	  above	  (3	  ii),	  immunity	  extends	  to	  civil	  cases;	  







(iv) Limited	  rights	  of	  victims	  hampering	  access	  to	  justice.	  	  
	  
5. Limited	  recognition	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  rights	  	  
(i) Weak	  constitutional	  status	  of	  ESCR	  rights	  is	  matched	  by	  limited	  recognition	  in	  statutory	  law.	  
(ii) Laws	  crucial	  for	  the	  respect	  for	  ESCR	  rights	  and	  development	  are	  deficient,	  including	  employment	  laws,	  
trade	  union	  law,	  land	  law	  and	  lack	  of	  effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  law.	  
(iii) Lack	   of	   laws	   regulating	   the	   informal	   sector,	   which	   predominantly	   include	   vulnerable	   groups	   in	   the	  
society	  (i.e.	  women,	  persons	  with	  disabilities,	  ethnic	  minorities)	  and	  other	  groups	  such	  as	  pastoralists,	  
seasonal	  farmers	  and	  domestic	  workers	  and	  labourers.	  	  
	  
Legislative	   reforms	   are	   closely	   linked	   to	   security	   sector	   reform.	   Priorities	   in	   this	   regard	   comprise	   a	   clear	  
mandate,	   limiting	   resort	   to	   emergency	   laws	   and	   removing	   of	   broad	   powers	   from	   forces,	   particularly	   the	  
National	  Intelligence	  and	  Security	  Services	  (NISS),	  which	  should	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  search,	  arrest	  and	  detain	  
individuals,	  focusing	  on	  intelligence	  only	   instead.	  Further,	   immunities	  for	   law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  the	  NISS	  
and	  the	  army	  should	  be	  removed	  and	  special	  courts	  abolished;	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  clear	  code	  of	  conducts	  for	  
the	  respective	  forces	  and	  effective	  complaints	  procedures	  and	  accountability	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  
	  
3. Law-­‐making	  process	  	  
Law	  has	  been	  used	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  ideological	  or	  political	  purposes,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  control	  and	  repression	  
and	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “civilization	  project”.	  This	  applies	  particularly	  to	  the	  use	  of	  Shari’a	  as	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  
Islamisation,	   first	   initiated	   in	   1983,	   and	   then	   reactivated	   with	   varying	   degrees	   of	   intensity	   since	   1989.	   Law	  
reform	   initiatives	   failed	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   due	   to	   a	   combination	   of	   factors	   (lack	   of	   receptiveness,	   political	  
weakness).	  In	  hindsight,	  while	  more	  could	  have	  been	  done	  to	  initiate	  reforms,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  repeal	  of	  
the	  1983	  September	  laws	  would	  have	  succeeded	  given	  that	  serious	  moves	  to	  do	  so	  were	  cut	  short	  by	  the	  1989	  
military	   coup.	   The	   CPA	   sets	   out	   a	   blueprint	   for	   major	   constitutional,	   legislative	   and	   institutional	   reforms.	  
However,	   the	   bodies	   tasked	   with	   undertaking	   the	   reforms,	   such	   as	   the	   National	   Constitutional	   Review	  
Commission	  (NCRC),	  were	  weak,	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  other	  Commissions	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Judicial	  
Service	   Commission,	   and	   the	   National	   Human	   Rights	   Commission	   (NHRC),	   which	   could	   play	   a	   role	   in	  
institutional	   reform.	   Due	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   democratic	   transformation	   envisaged	   in	   the	   CPA,	   there	   were	   no	  
fundamental	  changes	  in	  the	  law-­‐making	  and	  reform	  process	  and	  most	  of	  the	  newly	  enacted	  legislations	  during	  
the	  CPA	  are	  repressive	  (i.e.	  National	  Security	  Act	  2010,	  Trade	  Unions	  Act	  2010,	  Press	  and	  Printed	  Materials	  Act	  
2009,	  NGO	  Act	  2006).	  Reforms	  undertaken	  were	  haphazard	  and	  incoherent,	  with	  limited	  political	  engagement	  
on	   the	   part	   of	   opposition	   parties	   and,	   initially,	   civil	   society.	   As	   a	   result,	   substantive	   concerns	   over	   the	  
incompatibility	   of	   a	   number	   of	   laws	   with	   Sudan’s	   constitution	   and	   international	   human	   rights	   standards	  
remained	   largely	   unaddressed.	   This	   system	   has	   not	   changed	   since	   the	   2010	   election	   and	   South	   Sudan’s	  
independence	   in	   2011,	   with	   law	   making	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   an	   NCP	   dominated	   parliament	   and	   the	   President	  
(decree	  making	  power),	  and	  emergency	  powers	  and	  the	  ongoing	  armed	  conflicts	  affecting	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  
rule	  of	  law	  and	  governance.	  	  
There	   is	   a	   need	   for	   civil	   society	   to	   broaden	   its	   advocacy	   on	   the	   constitutional	   review	   and	   legislative	   reform	  
processes,	   effectively	   engaging	   various	   local	   constituencies	   and	   political	   opposition	   that	   have	   to	   date	   paid	  
limited	  attention	  to	  relevant	  issues	  and	  processes.	  This	  engagement	  should	  reach	  beyond	  specific	  matters	  and	  
raise	   issues	  of	  principles	  and	  governance,	   such	  as	  what	  a	  democratic	  and	  participatory	   constitutional	   review	  
and	  law	  reform	  process	  should	  look	  like	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  implemented	  in	  the	  Sudanese	  context.	  This	  includes	  







which	  has	  been	  limited	  to	  date.	  Current	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  political	  dialogue	  and	  forthcoming	  elections	  
provide	   possible	   openings	   despite	   the	   risks	   that	   this	   process	   will	   be	   utilised	   to	   legitimise	   existing	   power	  
structures.	  
Commitment	  to	  substantial	  law	  reform	  should	  be	  made	  a	  condition	  for	  meaningful	  political	  transition	  and	  any	  
meaningful,	   credible	   elections,	   which	   require	   a	   conducive	   environment	   where	   the	   law	   reform	   process	   may	  
have	   some	   impact.	   If	   and	   when	   such	   transition	   is	   under	   way,	   a	   body	   should	   be	   established	   (ensuring	  
independence	  of	  its	  members)	  to	  undertake	  a	  comprehensive	  review	  and	  propose	  detailed	  reforms.	  
Law	   reform	   should	   be	   integral	   to	   any	   transitional	   justice	   initiative,	   including	   peace	   agreements.	   Ideally,	   this	  
would	  entail	  detailed	  scrutiny	  of	  how	  various	  actors	  have	  used	  the	  law	  and	  the	  role	  of	  lawyers	  in	  drafting	  laws	  
that	  lend	  themselves	  to	  abuse.	  Any	  such	  scrutiny	  should	  be	  participatory,	  i.e.	  built	  on	  the	  lived	  experiences	  of	  
those	   who	   have	   been	   subject	   to	   the	   law,	   and	   should	   take	   into	   consideration	   best	   practices	   of	   legislative	  
reforms	  elsewhere.	  
Points	  for	  further	  reflection:	  
What	  should	  be	  the	  priorities	  for	  the	  law	  reform	  and	  law-­‐making	  process?	  
How	  best	  to	  engage	  political	  actors	  and	  the	  public	  at	  large?	  
	  
IV. Access	  to	  Justice	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   constitutional	   guarantee	   of	   the	   right	   to	   litigation,	   there	   is	   scant	   recognition	   of	   victims’	  
rights	   (standing,	   participation,	   protection,	   information),	   which	   has	   contributed	   to	   limited	   access	   to	   justice.	  
Victims	  of	  wrongs	  can	  have	  recourse	  to	  diya	  under	  Shari’a	  where	  applicable	  (wounds,	  murder)–though	  they	  will	  
have	  to	  choose	  between	  compensation	  and	  punishment.	  Victims	  of	  other	  wrongs	  can	  use	  tort	   law	  though	  its	  
utility	   is	   limited	   by	   a	   number	   of	   legal	   challenges,	   including	   standing	   (particularly	   collective),	   immunities	   (for	  
officials)	  and	  statutes	  of	  limitation.11	  
There	   are	   also	   numerous	   practical	   barriers	   to	   access	   justice	   in	   Sudan,	   particularly	   physical	   access	   (lack	   of	  
geographical	   coverage,	   breakdown	   of	   institutions	   in	   conflict	   areas)12,	   security	   concerns,	   fees	   (particularly	  
before	   the	   Constitutional	   Court),	   lack	   of	   or	   inadequate	   legal	   aid,	   corruption,	   and	   delays.	   Members	   of	  
marginalised	   communities	   (language,	   racism)	   and	   women	   (discriminatory	   laws,	   inability	   to	   independently	  
pursue	   case,	   bias)	   face	   additional	   obstacles.	   Many	   Sudanese	   have	   limited	   awareness	   of	   the	   formal	   system	  
and/or	  limited	  trust	  in	  accessing	  justice	  institutions.	  This	  is	  also	  due	  to	  the	  perceived	  lack	  of	  independence	  of	  
the	  judiciary,	  which	  equally	  applies	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  that	  has	  largely	  failed	  to	  act	  as	  strong	  guarantor	  
of	  human	  rights.	  
In	  the	  field	  of	  administrative	   law,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  obstacles	   is	  the	   lack	  of	  effective	   judicial	  review	  of	  executive	  
decisions	   issued	   by	   various	   branches	   of	   both	   federal	   government	   and	   localities	   which	   enjoy	   broad	   powers	  
derived	   from	   bylaws	  which,	   in	  many	   cases,	   contradict	   the	   laws	   and	   the	   constitution.	   These	   laws	   are	   barely	  
known	  to	  the	  public	  and	  are	  used	  as	  one	  of	  the	  means	  of	  oppression,	  such	  as	  imposing	  more	  taxation	  targeting	  
the	  poor	  and	  vulnerable	  who	  work	   in	  the	   informal	  sector	  or	  economy.	  The	  public	  order	  regime	  is	  an	  obvious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	  also	  Mohamed	  Abdelsalam	  Babiker,	  ‘The	  Prosecution	  of	  International	  Crimes	  under	  Sudan’s	  Criminal	  and	  Military	  Laws:	  Developments,	  
Gaps	  and	  Limitations’,	  in	  Lutz	  Oette	  (ed),	  Criminal	  law	  reform	  and	  transitional	  justice:	  Human	  rights	  perspectives	  for	  Sudan,	  Ashgate,	  Farnham,	  
2011,	  161-­‐181,	  at	  178-­‐9.	  
12	  In	  Darfur	  for	  example,	  currently	  prosecutors	  operate	  solely	  in	  the	  five	  state	  capitals	  of	  Darfur	  with	  no	  presence	  in	  rural	  areas	  which	  prevents	  
the	  proper	  administration	  of	  justice.	  See	  2013-­‐2019	  Developing	  Darfur:	  A	  Recovery	  and	  Reconstruction	  Strategy,	  Report	  issued	  pursuant	  to	  







example	  of	  how	  administrative	  decisions	   result	   in	   the	   repression	  of	  many,	   in	  particular	  women	  and	  are	  also	  
used	   to	   generate	   income	   for	   a	   repressive	   state	   through	   its	   administrative	   orders,	   decisions	   and	  procedures.	  
Judicial	   review	   has,	   however,	   been	   used	   –	   with	   mixed	   results	   -­‐	   in	   many	   cases	   to	   challenge	   government	  
decisions	   including	   abuse	   of	   power	   by	   ministers	   to	   close	   some	   human	   rights	   organizations	   and	   other	   civil	  
society	  groups.	  Other	  administrative	  decisions	  are	  also	  employed	  in	  the	  area	  of	  the	  right	  to	  nationality	  after	  the	  
secession	  of	  South	  Sudan	  but	  failed	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  justice	  and	  the	  hegemony	  of	  executive	  branches	  of	  
government.	   In	   some	  situations	  where	   courts	   issued	  decisions	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  victims,	   these	  have	  not	  been	  
implemented.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Customary	   courts	   or	   traditional	   justice	   mechanisms	   recognised	   by	   communities	   in	   the	   Sudan	   such	   as	   the	  
“Judia”	   system	   in	   Darfur	   or	   “Gald”	   in	   Eastern	   Sudan	   can	   play	   a	   complementary	   role	   in	   ensuring	   access	   to	  
justice.	   Unlike	   the	   repressive	   formal	   justice	   system,	   customary	   laws	   and	   courts	   with	   their	   established	  
substantive	   norms	   and	   procedures	   can	   play	   an	   effective	   role	   in	   social	   peace	   and	   also	   provide	   redress.	  
Customary	   laws	   as	   one	   of	   the	   traditional	   African	   justice	   systems	   can	   address	   the	   dilemma	   of	   realising	  
communal	  peace	  and	  reconciliation	  from	  a	  traditional	   justice	  perspective	  and	  provide	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  the	  
victims,	  in	  particular	  in	  armed	  conflict	  areas.	  However,	  the	  pertinent	  question	  is:	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  viable	  legal	  
system,	  i.e.	  effective	  formal	  rule	  of	  law	  institutions,	  can	  traditional	  justice	  fill	  the	  vacuum	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  
communal	   peace,	   redress	   violations	   and	   provide	   victims	   of	   crimes	   with	   some	   sort	   of	   reparation	   through	  
restorative	  justice	  and	  traditional	  justice	  mechanisms?	  	  
	  Beyond	  formal	  courts	  and	  customary	  law	  mechanisms,	  a	  number	  of	  commissions	  tasked	  with	  the	  monitoring	  
of	  grievances	  and/or	  protection	  have	  been	  put	   in	  place,	   including	  the	  NHRC	  and	  Advisory	  Council	   for	  Human	  
Rights.	  However,	   these	   bodies	   have	   been	   seen	   as	   not	   having	   the	   level	   of	   effective	   independence,	   calibre	   of	  
staff	  needed,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  under-­‐resourced	  and	  lacking	  capacity.	  A	  lot	  of	  hope	  was	  placed	  in	  the	  NHRC	  and	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  engage	  with	  it	  to	  test	  it	  and	  help	  it	  build	  capacity.	  However,	  tasking	  bodies	  with	  human	  rights	  
protection	  in	  a	  system	  that	  is	  repressive	  and	  where	  courts	  lack	  independence	  puts	  a	  lot	  of	  burden	  on	  them	  and	  
has	  frequently	  proved	  ineffectual.	  	  
As	   a	   result,	   victims	   of	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   particular	   have	   –	   with	   few	   exceptions	   –	   not	   received	   any	  
reparation	   for	   the	  harm	  suffered.	  This	   includes	   reparation	   for	  violations	   related	   to	  armed	  conflicts,	   including	  
North-­‐South	  (the	  CPA	  was	  silent	  on	  reparation)	  and	  Darfur,	   though	   limited	  measures	  have	  been	  taken	   in	  the	  
latter	  context	  to	  provide	  at	  least	  some	  reparation	  through	  various	  commissions	  under	  the	  Doha	  Document	  for	  
Peace	   in	   Darfur	   (DDPD)	   which	   also	   remain	   ineffective	   (i.e.	   Truth,	   Justice	   and	   Reconciliation	   Commission,	  
Property	  Claims	  Commission,	  Compensation	  Commission).	  	  Efforts	  towards	  reparation	  for	  mass	  victimisation	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  so-­‐called	  transitional	  justice	  initiatives	  are	  important	  and	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  in	  isolation;	  they	  
play	   a	   potentially	   important	   role	   in	   establishing	   principles,	   and	   can	   provide	   avenues	   to	   introduce	   systemic	  
changes	  to	  strengthen	  victims’	  rights	  and	  access	  to	  justice.	  
Further,	  at	  the	  supranational	  level,	  the	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  has	  issued	  a	  number	  
of	   decisions	   against	   Sudan,	   with	   several	   other	   cases	   pending.	   However,	   none	   of	   its	   decisions	   have	   been	  
implemented.	   There	   is	   reportedly	   a	   newly	   established	   unit	   within	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Justice	   to	   handle	  
implementation	  but	  little	  is	  known	  about	  its	  work.	  	  
Ultimately,	   improving	  access	   to	   justice	   requires	  a	   substantial	  overhaul	  of	   the	   current	   system,	  which	   includes	  









Points	  for	  further	  reflection:	  
Undertake	  empirical	  research	  on	  experiences	  with	  access	  to	  justice	  across	  the	  country.	  
Identify	  “transitional	  justice”	  priorities	  of	  victims	  of	  serious	  human	  rights	  violations	  by	  means	  of	  
extensive	  consultation.	  
Bring	  together	   like-­‐minded	   judges	  and	  officials	   to	  advocate	  changes	  concerning	  administration	  
of	  justice	  and/or	  encourage	  judges	  to	  engage	  in	  judicial	  activism.	  	  
	  
V. Justice	  and	  accountability	  
Lack	  of	  justice	  and	  criminal	  accountability	  for	  human	  rights	  violations,	  international	  crimes	  and	  abuse	  of	  office	  
more	   generally	   is	   deeply	   engrained	   in	   Sudan’s	   legal	   system.	   There	   is	   an	   almost	   complete	   impunity	   for	   such	  
crimes.	   Most	   notably,	   both	   parties	   to	   the	   CPA	   reportedly	   agreed	   not	   to	   prosecute	   any	   crimes	   committed,	  
reflecting	   the	  primacy	  of	   the	  political	   over	   the	   law.	  The	  CPA	  also	  does	  not	   include	   any	   specific	   provision	  on	  
accountability	  or	  transitional	  justice.	  Subsequent	  efforts	  towards	  ensuring	  accountability	  in	  the	  Darfur	  context	  
have	   equally	   failed.	  Numerous	   justice	   initiatives,	   from	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   to	   the	  African	  Union	  
High	  Level	  Panel	  on	  Darfur,	  have	  been	  ignored.13	  
Of	   the	   legislative	   shortcomings	   identified	   above	   (III	   (2)),	   which	   are	   central	   to	   security	   sector	   reform,	   i.e.	  
immunities	   are	   the	   most	   symbolic	   expression	   of	   impunity.	   However,	   even	   if	   there	   were	   substantial	   legal	  
reforms,	  which	  have	  been	  set	  out	  in	  some	  detail	  by	  the	  AU	  High	  Level	  Panel	  on	  Darfur	  in	  its	  2009	  report,	  there	  
are	  still	  a	  series	  of	  institutional	  shortcomings	  to	  be	  addressed.	  This	  includes	  the	  institutional	  independence	  and	  
capacity	  of	   law	  enforcement	  bodies	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  Investigations	  of	  crimes	  are	  often	  
deficient,	   failing	   to	   use	   internationally	   recognised	   investigative	  methods.	   For	   example,	   form	  8	   used	   for	   rape	  
cases	   is	   inadequate	   and	   the	   Istanbul	   Protocol	   is	   not	   used	   in	   cases	   of	   alleged	   torture	   or	   other	   ill-­‐treatment.	  
Further,	  the	  prosecutor	  “is	  part	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  which	  is	  comprised	  of	  officials	  of	  the	  executive,	  with	  
the	   inherent	   risk	  of	  bias	   in	   favour	  of	  his	  or	  her	  employer,	   the	  government.”14	  Even	  were	  officials	  accused	  of	  
having	   committed	   crimes	   are	   prosecuted,	   this	   is	   done	   before	   special	   courts	   whose	   proceedings	   lack	  
transparency,	   lack	   a	   system	   of	   witness	   protection	   and	   may	   shield	   the	   accused	   from	   full	   accountability.	   In	  
contrast	   to	   this	   strong	   executive	   bias,	   victims	   have	   virtually	   no	   rights	   in	   proceedings,	   such	   as	   the	   right	   to	  
participate,	   to	   be	  protected,	   and	   to	   be	   kept	   informed	  of	   developments.	   Special	   courts	   also	   use	   the	   criminal	  
procedures	  in	  the	  context	  of	  normal	  crimes	  committed	  in	  peace	  time	  and	  hence	  lack	  rules	  of	  procedures	  and	  
evidence	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  international	  tribunals.	  	  	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  experiences,	  there	  are	  two	  apparent	  scenarios	  how	  to	  break	  the	  culture	  of	  impunity.	  The	  first	  
option	  would	  be	  a	  committed,	  sufficiently	  high-­‐profile	  undertaking	  to	  bring	  perpetrators	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  
international	  humanitarian	  law	  violations	  and	  international	  crimes	  to	  justice	  (in	  Sudan	  or	  elsewhere).	  There	  is	  
no	   realistic	   prospect	   of	   this	   happening	   in	   the	   present	   circumstances	   though	   individual	   cases	   may	   be	  
successfully	  pursued	  in	  third	  countries.	  A	  culture	  of	  accountability	  can	  also	  be	  developed	  in	  a	  more	  incremental	  
fashion	  by:	  (i)	  exposing	  crimes	  and	  calling	  for	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  –	  this	  has	  happened	  in	  a	  number	  
of	  cases,	  and	  has	  helped	  to	  document	  cases	  and	  highlight	  shortcomings;	  (ii)	  engaging	  in	  a	  discourse	  aimed	  at	  a	  
principled	   way	   of	   dealing	   with	   wrongdoing	   where	   everyone	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   law	   irrespective	   of	   his	   or	   her	  
identity;	  and	  (iii)	  using	  opportunities	  to	  instil	  such	  a	  culture	  through	  teaching	  and	  advocacy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  African	  Union	  High-­‐Level	  Panel	  Report	  on	  Darfur	  (AUPD),	  29	  October	  2009,	  PSC/AHG/2(CCVII).	  
14	  Amin	  M.	  Medani,	  ‘A	  Legacy	  of	  Institutionalized	  Repression:	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Justice	  in	  Sudan’,	  in	  Lutz	  Oette	  (ed),	  Criminal	  law	  reform	  and	  







In	  addition	  to	  the	  legislative	  reforms	  set	  out	  above,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  substantial	  overhaul	  of	  the	  system	  of	  
investigating	   and	   prosecuting	   alleged	   crimes	   committed	   by	   or	   with	   the	   involvement	   of	   officials.	   This	   would	  
include:	  (i)	  a	  prosecution	  service	  answerable	  to	  an	  independent	  Attorney	  General;	  (ii)	  special	  investigative	  units	  
that	   are	   institutionally	   independent	   from	   the	   alleged	   perpetrators;	   (iii)	   use	   of	   recognised	   investigative	  
methods,	   including	   changes	   to	   form	   8,	   introduction	   of	   Istanbul	   Protocol	   and	   Minnesota	   Protocol	   to	   guide	  
investigations	   into	  torture	  and	  extrajudicial	  killings	   respectively;	   (iv)	  abolition	  of	  special	  courts	   for	   the	  police,	  
the	  NISS	  and	  the	  army;	  and	  (iv)	  strengthening	  victims’	  rights	  (see	  above).	  
These	   reforms	   are	   predicated	   on	   the	   recognition	   that	   the	   current	   system	   has	   perpetuated	   impunity.	   This	  
means,	  by	  definition,	  that	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  personnel	  involved	  in	  running	  the	  system	  has	  been	  implicated	  in	  
serious	  failings	  if	  not	  violations.	  Reforms	  would	  therefore	  require	  addressing	  the	  legal	  and	  institutional	  legacy	  
of	   impunity,	   which	   realistically	   would	   need	   to	   take	   some	   form	   of	   transitional	   justice	   initiative.	   Besides	  
legislative	  and	  institutional	  reforms,	  this	  would	  also	  need	  to	  entail	  a	  process	  for	  lustration	  (removing	  someone	  
from	  office	  for	  past	  wrongdoing)	  and	  vetting	  (assessing	  whether	  someone	  is	  fit	  for	  office),	  which	  would	  itself	  
need	  to	  adhere	  to	  due	  process	  
Ultimately,	  a	  wholesale	  change	  of	  political,	   legal	  and	   institutional	  culture	   is	  needed.	  This	  will	   require	  a	  public	  
process	   and	   debate	   that	   would	   not	   only	   focus	   on	   laws	   and	   institutions	   but	   also	   on	   power	   imbalances	   and	  
inequality,	   particularly	   on	   how	   marginalisation	   and	   discrimination	   results	   in	   victimisation	   and	   impunity.	   A	  
genuine	  culture	  of	  accountability	  therefore	  needs	  to	  reach	  beyond	  specific	   initiatives	  and	  change	  perceptions	  
of	  what	  is	  acceptable	  behaviour,	  including	  why	  accountability	  to	  the	  law	  is	  in	  the	  public	  interest.	  	  	  
Points	  for	  further	  reflection:	  
Undertake	   research/surveys	   (in	   Sudan	   and	   abroad)	   on	   people’s	   understandings	   of,	   and	  
expectations	  of	  what	  should	  be	  done	  in	  regards	  to	  accountability	  and	  justice.	  
	  
VI. Institutions,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  judiciary	  
While	  there	  has	  been	  considerable	  investment	  into	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  system,	  there	  are	  systemic	  problems	  in	  
the	   administration	   of	   justice	   characterised	   by	   inadequate	   infrastructure,	   limited	   capacity	   and	  
maladministration.	  
While	   several	   efforts	   have	   been	   made	   to	   build	   the	   capacity	   of	   criminal	   justice	   institutions,	   there	   are	   still	  
concerns	   about	   corruption	   and	   recourse	   to	   arbitrary	   detention,	   as	   well	   as	   torture	   and	   ill-­‐treatment	   in	  
investigating	  cases.	  This	  persistence	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  judiciary’s	  supervisory	  role	  and	  lack	  of	  
access	   to	   justice	  but	  needs	   to	  be	  addressed	  also	  by	  means	  of	  police	   reforms,	   including	  by	  putting	   in	  place	  a	  
better	  disciplinary	  system	  and	  training	  the	  police	  in	  using	  appropriate	  investigation	  methods.	  
The	  judiciary	  has	  undergone	  fundamental	  change	  since	  1989.	  Following	  the	  mass	  dismissal	  of	  judges,	  many	  of	  
whom	  were	   trained	   in	   the	   common	   law	   system,	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   judges	   have	   grown	   up	   in	   the	   present	  
system	  where	  the	  legal	  system	  is	  confusing	  and	  hybrid	  (common	  law,	  continental,	  Shari’a).	  Many	  if	  not	  most	  of	  
them	  have	  been	  trained	  in	  Shari’a	  and	  must	  show	  at	   least	  outward	  loyalty	  to	  the	  regime	  while	  others	  do	  not	  
have	   proper	   exposure	   and	   lack	   education	   in	   other	   legal	   systems.	   The	   judiciary	   has	   been	   politicised	   in	   high	  
profile	   cases,	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   counter-­‐terrorism,	   corruption	  and	  political	   crimes.	   The	   courts	  have	  a	  
poor	   record	   in	   applying	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   there	   are	   hardly	   any	   cases	   in	   which	   courts,	  







The	  constitution	  guarantees	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  a	  national	  judicial	  service	  commission	  was	  
appointed.	  However,	  the	  Commission,	  which	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  NCP	  members,	  has	  focused	  on	  technical	  
issues	  rather	  than	  substantive	  aspects	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  autonomy	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  avoid	  the	  hegemony	  
of	  the	  Presidency.	  This	  includes	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  budget	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  making	  “recommendations”	  to	  the	  
executive	  on	  the	  appointment	  of	  judges	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  his	  deputies,	  judges	  
of	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  other	   judges.	   It	  has	  not	  taken	  any	  measures	  with	  regard	  to	  frequently	  raised	  concerns	  
relating	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  This	  includes	  –	  besides	  interference	  in	  particular	  cases	  -­‐	  judicial	  
competence	  over	  judicial	  work,	  the	  interference	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  staying	  
or	   dismissing	   legal	   proceedings	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   judiciary	   with	   regard	   to	   special	   courts	   and	   immunities	  
granted	  to	   law	  enforcement	  officials.	  One	  of	  the	   lessons	   learned	  from	  the	  work	  of	  these	  CPA	  Commissions	   is	  
that	   they	   failed	   to	   make	   an	   impact	   on	   rule	   of	   law	   issues.	   Also,	   the	   executive	   carefully	   manipulated	   the	  
appointment	   or	   selection	   of	   its	   members	   (as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   other	   commissions)	   and	   their	   operational	  
independence	  were	  compromised.	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  fundamental	  questions	  surrounding	  the	   independence	  of	  the	   judiciary,	  there	  are	  also	  concerns	  
relating	   to	   infrastructure	  and	  capacity,	  particularly	   in	   remote	  or	  conflict	  areas	   that	  have	   resulted	   in	  a	   lack	  of	  
coverage	  and	  lawlessness,	  as	  well	  as	  limited	  resources	  and	  corruption.	  	  
Ultimately,	   substantial	   reforms	   are	   needed,	   addressing	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   national	   judicial	   service	  
commission	  appointed	  as	  part	  of	  the	  CPA	  implementation	  process.	  This	   includes	   in	  particular	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  
court	   system,	  measures	   to	  guarantee	   independence,	   lustration	  and	  vetting	  of	   judges,	  as	  well	  as	   training	  and	  
case	  allocation.	  	  
Points	  for	  further	  reflection:	  
Undertake	   empirical	   research	   on	   administration	   of	   justice,	   particularly	   insider	   views	   on	  
problems	  experienced	  and	  reforms	  needed/possible.	  
Bring	   together	   like-­‐minded	   judges	   and	   officials	   to	   work	   on/	   advocate	   changes	   concerning	  
administration	  of	  justice.	  
	  
VII. Legal	  Profession	  
There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	   relating	   to	   the	   legal	   profession.	   While	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  
number	  of	   law	  schools	  and	  lawyers,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  critical	   issues:	  (i)	  Lack	  of	   independence	  of	  the	  Bar	  
Association	  undermining	  lawyers’	  freedom	  of	  association	  as	  a	  professional	  group;	  (ii)	  shift	  towards	  teaching	  of	  
Islamic	   law	  (as	  the	  main	  source	  of	   legislation)	  resulting	   in	   lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  other	   legal	  systems,	   including	  
international	   law;	   (iii)	   use	   of	   Arabic	   as	   a	  medium	  of	   instruction	   has	   resulted	   in	   limited	   capacity	   to	   read	   and	  
write	  English	  texts	  and	  cases	  from	  other	  jurisdictions;	  (iv)	  falling	  standards	  (quality	  of	  drafting,	  analysis,	  ethical	  
conduct)	   resulting	   from	   proliferation	   of	   schools	   and	   lack	   of	   quality	   teaching	   in	   several	   of	   them.	   Some	  
universities	  run	  successful	  courses,	  including	  on	  human	  rights,	  and	  legal	  training	  has	  been	  provided,	  however,	  
these	  activities	  have	  been	  too	  piecemeal	  to	  offset	  the	  general	  trend.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  system	  of	  legal	  education	  should	  be	  substantially	  overhauled	  based	  on	  a	  careful	  examination	  of	  
the	  objectives	  of	  legal	  education	  and	  how	  they	  can	  be	  best	  achieved	  in	  the	  Sudanese	  context.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  
for	  legal	  education	  to	  be	  “transformative”	  rather	  than	  only	  disseminating	  knowledge	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  shall	  
target	  and	  engage	  justice	  sector	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  transform	  society	  towards	  enshrining	  the	  principles	  of	  







called	  “educational”	  or	  “academic	  activism”.	  For	  the	   legal	  profession,	  the	  main	  goal	  will	  be	  to	  re-­‐establish	   its	  
independence,	  particularly	  that	  of	  the	  Bar	  Association.	  
	  
	  
Points	  for	  further	  reflection:	  
Undertake	   empirical,	   participatory	   research	   on	   legal	   education	   in	   Sudan,	   identifying	   strengths	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